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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine and
examine the reactions of Congressional and public
opinion to the Truman administration's reversal of its
demilitarization policy for Western Germany.
In September of 1950, the Truman administration
responded to increasingly alarming Cold War
developments by deciding to arm Western Germany as a
bulwark against Communist expansion into Western
Europe.
Advocacy for this policy change originated in
the Defense Department.
The State Department
subsequently adopted it as practical for the political
purposes of the United States, and President Truman was
ultimately convinced of its necessity by the outbreak
of armed conflict in Korea.
Congressional opinion before the advent of the
Korean conflict actively opposed German rearmament on
the grounds that a remilitarized Germany might resume
the ultranationalist activities of the Third Reich.
After June of 1950, however, Congressional quickly
shifted to a position of support for German rearmament.
Public opinion likewise reflected a distrust of
Germany prior to the Korean conflict, as well as a
strong current of opposition to German rearmament.
By
the end of 1950, however, a majority of Americans had
switched to a position of advocacy of German
rearmament.
Congress and the public, despite strong opposition
to German rearmament prior to June of 1950, quickly
fell in line behind the Truman administration's new
policy after September.
No organized protest against
the policy ever developed.
It is suggested that a
combination of the Cold War realignment of world power
and the immediate military crisis in Korea caused a
perception of the new Soviet threat to outweigh
lingering fears of Germany and therefore permitted
Congress and the public to acquiesce to a policy of
German rearmament.

THE POSTWAR CONVERSION TO GERMAN REARMAMENT:

A LOOK AT THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS,

AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of a democracy
cannot be successfully carried on for very
long unless the policy-makers continually
consult public opinion.(1)
:
---George Gallup

In the governmental system of the United States,
foreign-policy decisions are the province of the President.
As the chief official of the executive branch, the President
necessarily has the ultimate say in matters of foreign
policy and consequently assumes responsibility for the
success or failure of policies he has authored or approved.
Assisting the President in the making of foreign-policy
decisions are a number of other officers representing the
various departments built into the executive structure of
the government.

Of these officers, the Secretary of State

traditionally assumes the most significant and visible role.
Though the Secretary’s actual powers are only vaguely hinted
at in the Constitution and are in practice therefore limited
by the whims of the President in office, the Secretary of
State and the department which he heads wield considerable
influence upon the President and upon the nature of United

3

States foreign policy.

Similarly, the members of the

Defense Department, who offer recommendations concerning
national security based upon the current and projected
military status of the United States, exert a powerful
influence upon the President, particularly since the
twentieth-century advent of the United States as a world
power.

In the end, though, the power to make decisions

affecting the tenor of American foreign policy rests with
the President alone.
The ability of the President to translate those
decisions into actual, functioning foreign-policy programs
is subject, however, to a series of specific checks which
reside within the houses of Congress.

By direct action,

Congress can affect American foreign policy in three ways.
First, a two-thirds vote of approval in Senate is required
to ratify any treaties concluded by the United States with
foreign governments.

Second, Congress as a whole controls

the fabled "purse strings” of the federal budget and by
withholding the necessary appropriations can prevent the
President's foreign policy-programs from being carried out.
Third, when a foreign-policy decision requires legislation
for its enactment, Congress can voice its support or lack
thereof through normal legislative channels.
In addition to these direct methods of influencing the
foreign-policy programs of the United States, Congress also
contributes in two indirect ways to the decision-making
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process involved in the executive creation of foreign
policy.

Both houses of Congress regularly propose and adopt

resolutions relative to current political questions which
are subsequently directed to the executive.

These

resolutions can exert considerable pressure upon
foreign-policy makers and, as Charles Lerche noted in his
Foreign Policy of the American People, are "especially
effective when they represent accurately the state of public
opinion and when they are passed prior to the making of a
firm commitment by the executive.11(2) Both houses are also
empowered to authorize investigations into all facets of the
foreign-policy process, including both the creation and
implementation of policies as well as the progress of
policies already in place.

The publicized results of such

investigations can create "powerful currents of public
opinion," and therefore have the potential to influence the
decisions of the executive.(3) In short, then, Congress'
role in the making of American foreign policy can be reduced
to endorsing (or refusing to endorse) executive decisions
through ratification, appropriation, and legislation, and to
participation of sorts in the executive decision-making
process by means of Congressional resolutions and
investigations, both of which frequently invoke the specter
of public opinion.
This specter, in turn, raises another series of
limiting factors on the President's ability to conduct
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foreign policy:

those ways in which the attitudes of the

American public can influence the executive decision-making
process.

Difficult though it is to accurately gauge

so-called "public" opinion when, as Gabriel Almond has
theorized, there exist in reality several publics (general,
attentive, and elite, as well as ethnic, religious, and
other interest groups), the prevailing attitudes among the
mass public, or the public as a whole, unquestionably serve
to either legitimize or condemn the foreign-policy decisions
of the government.(4) Specifically in the arena of
foreign-policy, the public performs three basic tasks.

The

first of these is to determine the "outermost limits of
permissible government actions."

Simply put, the government

cannot indefinitely act in a fashion which is unacceptable
to the majority of American people.

Though the government

quite often undertakes clandestine activities, particularly
in civil-military settings, so as to avoid the pressure of
unfavorable public opinion, major far-reaching
foreign-policy programs cannot ultimately be kept secret and
must therefore be resolved by means to which the public
gives its approval, tacit or otherwise.

The second task of

public opinion is to "delineate the general direction in
which policy should move and to isolate certain landmark
objectives" of foreign policy.

Substantial public outcry

concerning foreign-policy issues will almost certainly
prompt political responses designed to still that outcry,
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even when shifts in the direction of foreign policy are
distasteful to the policy-makers in office.

The final task

performed by American public opinion regarding foreign
policy is to debate and decide "crucial issues so important
in themselves that the government dare not proceed until
public sentiment has come to rest.11(5)
In practice, then, the American foreign-policy process
is a three-fold one:

the executive branch of government

assesses the problems facing the United States within the
foreign-policy arena and devises policies to meet those
problems;

Congress attempts to influence the executive as

it undertakes to make policy decisions, and then exercises
the right to "veto” policy programs requiring legislation,
appropriations, or Senate ratification?

the American

populace, finally, reacts to policy decisions which have
been made public and eventually voices its approval or
disapproval, thereby indicating to the executive certain
directions and parameters for future foreign-policy
decisions.
In 1948, Harry S.

Truman was elected President of the

United States, and he and his new Secretary of State Dean
Acheson spent the next four years directing the foreign
policy of the United States through the formative years of
the Cold War.

Their policies with regard to Western Europe

and Asia, combined with a newly militant anti-Soviet stance,
created a political legacy which would profoundly affect

7

American foreign relations for years to come.

The North

Atlantic Alliance and the attempt to create a political and
military union among the nations of Western Europe assumed a
particular importance for the Truman administration and were
hailed by the New York Times in June of 1952 as the "most
exciting and revolutionary foreign policy adventure since
World War II."(6) Central to this adventure was the American
decision to rearm Germany, a decision representing a
complete reversal of the administration's previous German
policy.

The study which follows is a brief examination of

the events leading to Truman's and Acheson's decision to
rearm Germany, of Congressional and public reaction to that
decision, and of the extent to which the opinions of
Congress and the public coincided with and served to
influence the foreign policy of the Truman administration in
this area.
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Notes for Introduction

(1)George Gallup, Foreword to The Public and American
Foreign Policy 1918-1978, by Ralph B. Levering (New York:
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1976), p. 56.
(3)Ibid., p.

55.

(4)Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and
Foreign Policy (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1960), p.
138.
(5)Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People, 3d
ed., pp.
31, 32.
(6)"Parties United On Europe Despite Campaign
Oratory,” New York Times, 12 June 1952, p. 5.

CHAPTER I
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO REARM GERMANY

Throughout history, those who have
tried hardest to do the right thing have
often been persecuted, misrepresented, or
even assassinated, but eventually what they
stood for has come to the top and been
adopted by the people.(1)
Harry S . Truman

As the Second World War drew to a close in Europe in
spring of 1945, the problem of what to do with Germany, how
to incorporate it eventually into a reconstructed European
community, assumed a position of primary importance on the
agendas of Allied leaders.

That the defeat of Germany would

remove the practical underpinnings of the Soviet alliance
with Great Britain and the United States presaged an
inevitable political conflict of interests as to the fate of
Germany and of Central Europe as a whole.

Meanwhile, as

Allied forces rapidly occupied German territory and exposed
the full extent of Nazi atrocities, a global sentiment
quickly emerged which called for the punishment of those
responsible.

In light of these developments, opinions on

how to deal with Germany after the war proliferated in the
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United States, running the gamut of extremes from Henry
Morgenthau's proposal to reduce Germany more or less
permanently to an agricultural state to General Patton's
half-cocked scheme to enlist German military aid in a
campaign against the Soviet Union.
Thus it was that in April of 1945, when Germany's
defeat had become imminent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
a directive (JCS 1067) to General Eisenhower, then
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation
in Germany, defining the immediate and long-range goals of
military government in occupied Germany.

In paragraph 4,

article c, of JCS 1067 the "principal Allied objective" was
defined as preventing Germany "from ever again becoming a
threat to the peace of the world."

A series of steps

essential to the realization of this principal objective was
then outlined and included "the elimination of Nazism and
militarism,

.

the industrial disarmament and

demilitarization of Germany,

.

and the preparation

for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a
democratic basis."

These basic steps formed the core of the

policy conducted by the American military government in its
zone of occupation and subsequently in bizone and
trizone.(2)
A second directive relative to American policy toward
occupied Germany (JCS 1779) was issued by the Joint Chiefs
in July of 1947, this time in a climate of deteriorating
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relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and
Great Britain.

The American commitments to denazification,

demilitarization, and disarmament of Germany were reiterated
and, reflecting a declaration made by Secretary of State
Marshall before Congress in early 1947 that the economic
revival of Germany was necessary to the restoration of the
European economy, the directive stated as general United
States policy that, in order to ensure a lasting peace, "an
orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic
contributions of a stable and productive Germany as well as
the necessary restraints to insure that Germany is not
allowed to revive its destructive militarism.M (3)
This latter statement of general policy toward Germany
implied an American realization that Germany could not be
allowed to remain a prisoner of war indefinitely.

To

American policy-makers, the economic well-being of Western
Europe depended upon an industrially revived Germany aligned
both politically and economically to the West.

The

increasingly alarming breakdown of four-power cooperation in
governing occupied Germany had already prompted the United
States, Great Britain, and France to take measures,
independent of the Soviet Union, to insure that the Western
occupation zones, at least, would conform to their vision of
a "stable and productive" Germany.

In January of 1947 the

United States and Great Britain began the process of merging
their zones of occupation, and later the same year France
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agreed to merge its zone as well with those of the British
and Americans.

Soon thereafter, at a series of meetings in

London between February and June of 1948, the United States,
Great Britain, and France determined to coordinate the
economic policy of the three Western zones, to include West
Germany in the European Recovery Program, and to write a
democratic constitution for West Germany which would provide
for a constituent assembly and a federal German government.
Confronted with the establishment of an economically
revived and democratically aligned West German state, the
Soviet Union, which had wanted to create a united but
demilitarized Germany existing either neutrally or under
Soviet influence, was forced to take parallel measures to
secure its hold over the eastern zone of Germany.

Thus, a

de facto division of Germany came about which caused the
development of a new strategic situation in Central Europe
and, as the Cold War took shape, planted the seed which
would grow during Truman's second administration into a new
American policy for Western Germany:

rearmament and

incorporation into a Western European defense network.
This new policy, amounting as it did to a complete
reversal of one of the basic objectives which the United
States had pursued in Germany since the end of the war
(industrial demilitarization and disarmament), was arrived
at gradually and through specific stages.

It began in 1949

in the Department of Defense as a reassessment of the
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military needs of Western Europe in the face of a powerful
Soviet adversary;

it was eventually adopted by Secretary of

State Acheson as a practical means of simultaneously
achieving his political objectives in Western Europe aswell
as providing for European defense;

and finally, it was

approved by President Truman as he faced war abroad and
political opposition at home.

Furthermore, between 1948 and

1950, events conspired to point American policy in Germany
toward the decision to rearm.
The Soviet blockade of Berlin was the first of these
events and the first major post-war confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union.

Instituted as a

challenge to the efforts of the United States, Great Britain
and France to unite the three Western

zones economically and

politically, and as a response to the

prospect of a

revitalized Western outpost well inside the Soviet
occupation zone, the blockade closed off all overland access
to West Berlin on 24 June 1948, using as an immediate
pretext the announcement of currency reforms in the Western
zones and West Berlin.(4) Truman's response was to hold firm
by organizing a counterblockade and a round-the-clock
airlift to supply the isolated city.

A stand-off developed

and continued for almost a year until the Soviets, unwilling
to raise the level of force and convinced that the United
States would not abandon its plans for a West German state,
began to lift the blockade in April of 1949.
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Though the entire episode amounted to a diplomatic
defeat for the Soviet Union, the blockade served to heighten
tensions between the Western Allies and the Soviets and to
dramatize the potential for a military conflict in Central
Europe.

Reflecting upon the blockade in his memoirs,

President Truman concluded that it was a "move to test our
capacity and will to resist.

This and the previous attempts

to take over Greece and Turkey were part of a Russian plan
to probe for soft spots in the Western Allies' positions all
around their own perimeter."(5) Thus the incident
demonstrated to the Truman administration the efficacy of a
firm response to Soviet advances, and it also sparked an
anxious reappraisal among American military leaders of
Soviet willingness to play the aggressor in Europe.

The

subsequent signing of the North Atlantic Pact on 4 April
1949 reflected a growing concern with the military defenses
of Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression.
The successful explosion of an atomic bomb by the
Soviet Union in September of 1949, several years before
Western experts had predicted the Soviets would achieve
atomic capability, further complicated the strategic
situation in Europe.

This breaking of the American atomic

monopoly forced American military leaders to begin to
reevaluate the grand strategy of the United States.

In a

future war with the Soviet Union, the American military
could no longer expect to compensate for inferior
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conventional forces by the exclusive use of atomic weapons.
If the Soviets assembled an arsenal of atomic bombs,
manpower would once again become "queen of the battle," and
in manpower, particularly in the European theater, the
Soviet Union enjoyed a decided advantage over the Western
Allies.
Recognizing the gravity of the situation, President
Truman authorized the development of a hydrogen bomb, hoping
to regain for the United States the technological lead in
strategic weaponry.

American military leaders, however,

began to lobby for increasing conventional military presence
in areas of strategic importance, including the rearming of
Germany to provide for the defense of Western Europe.(6)
Simultaneously with this reappraisal of American
defense requirements, a similar reappraisal of Cold War
foreign policy occupied the members of the National Security
Council who, in early 1950, began to draft a highly secret
blueprint of American geo-political objectives.

This

document, which was masterminded by Secretary of State
Acheson and which came to be known as NSC-68, emphasized the
new polarization of world power between the United States
and the Soviet Union and the fundamental ideological
antagonism between the political systems of the two states.
It further warned that the Soviet Union fully intended to
impose its absolute authority upon those geographical areas
"now under [its] control," and ultimately upon the entire
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"Eurasian land mass."(7) To prevent this catastrophe from
occurring, NSC-68 asserted, the United States was to assume
the task of imposing "order" upon those areas not already
under Soviet control so as to provide a political and
economic environment within which free societies could grow
and flourish.

To that end, NSC-68 presented an outline of

specific policy recommendations for the United States, one
of which was to rapidly increase American and Western
conventional military forces as a deterrent against Soviet
aggression and as a means of realizing American political
around the globe.
There were critics of NSC-68 within the State
Department, notably George F.

Kennan and Charles Bohlen,

each of whom disagreed with Acheson's analysis of Soviet
policy as "nothing more than an absolute determination to
spread the Communist system throughout the world."

Kennan

and Bohlen took a more realistic approach to understanding
Soviet foreign policy by assuming that the Soviet Union was
acting as a national state whose primary interest was to
protect itself and its satellites, whereas the "extension of
Communism to other areas [was] a theoretical and secondary
goal."(8) Acheson, however, rejected this line of thought,
and Kennan's departure for Princeton in early 1950
effectively neutralized his influence in the State
Department.

And Bohlen, who was in France at the time

NSC-68 was drawn up, did not read it until 1951, well after
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the issue was decided in Acheson's favor.
In April of 1950, NSC-68 was presented to President
Truman who concurred wholeheartedly with the world-view
offered in the report and agreed with the conclusion that
the Western Allies must indeed increase their armed forces
to meet the Russian danger.
The North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June
1950 convincingly demonstrated to the Truman administration
the veracity of the assumptions underlying NSC-68 and
provided ample opportunity for the implementation of new
policies consistent with the secret Cold War blueprint.

And

though the immediate military conflict had occurred in Asia,
it inevitably drew American attention once again to Europe
and to the heart of American foreign policy.

From a

military standpoint, the situation in Germany in 1950 was
roughly analogous to that in Korea.

Both states were

divided politically and constituted potential flash-points
along the perimeter of the Soviet Union.

The stakes in

Europe, however, were much higher that those in Korea, and
at the time of the North Korean invasion the defenses of the
Western Allies were less than ideal.

A Soviet-supplied

police force numbering 60,000 men had been raised in East
Germany and was supported by twenty-seven Soviet divisions
in the Democratic Republic.

Seventy-five more Soviet

divisions were readily available for deployment in the
Central European theater.

Against this force, the Western
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Allies in NATO "could muster only twelve divisions,
ill-equipped, uncoordinated, and deployed with no thought of
combat."(9) Clearly Western Europe in 1950 was unprepared to
defend itself against a Soviet Union determined to impose
its will upon the entire Eurasian land mass.
By late 1950, then, as the United States found itself
locked into a global political struggle with an enemy
perceived to be fanatically determined, an enemy whose
aggressiveness had been demonstrated by the Berlin Blockade
and by the Korean conflict, an enemy with formidable
conventional forces and a newly acquired atomic capability,
the global political environment had shifted to the point
that the Truman administration was willing to embark upon a
radical new course in American foreign policy.

And integral

to that new course was the decision to rearm West Germany
scarcely five years after Germany, under the Nazis, had been
forced to halt its own bid for European domination.
As previously noted, this movement to rearm Germany
began with the strategic musings of the Department of
Defense.

Reflecting on the European situation in early

1950, Dean Acheson stated that "for some years the Defense
Department had held that Europe could not be defended
without the willing and active participation of Western
Germany."(10) Though the State Department and the President
held steadfastly to the principle of German
demilitarization, Defense Department officials continued to
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stress the need, from a purely military standpoint, of
rearming Germany.

By late 1949, following the Berlin

Blockade and the successful Soviet atomic explosion,
military leaders began to advocate publicly the use of
German troops for Western defense.
General Lucius D.

On 21 November 1949,

Clay, the former Chief of United States

Forces in Occupied Germany, proposed the creation of a
composite European military force, including German units,
as "a means of building a unified Europe free from fear of
Russian aggression."(11) General Clay stressed that, though
the composite force should be strong enough to contain
Soviet advances, no one of the participating nations should
be capable of waging aggressive war on its own.
days later, on 9 December, the weekly U.S.

Several

News and World

Report published an article entitled "German Army?

Generals

Say Yes," in which a group of unidentified Western generals
gave a "hard-headed military appraisal of what is going on
as military men express it in their own language."(12) In no
uncertain terms, this article warned of the determination of
the Soviet Union to gain control of Germany, discounted the
effectiveness of the atom bomb as a defensive weapon, and
insisted that the next war would be decided, as always, by
land armies.

Warning that "time is growing short for

Western armies to catch up," the article ended with a
recommendation for the construction of a German army as a
necessary ingredient in the defense of Western Europe.
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The public arguments of these "hard-headed” generals
echoed the private sentiments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
who began, through the National Security Council, to put
pressure on President Truman to consider the possibility of
arming Germany.

National Security Council memorandum number

71 reported that the Joint Chiefs, as of 2 May 1950, were of
the opinion that ”the appropriate and early rearming of
Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of
Western Europe against the USSR.” (13) This statement was
followed up on 17 May by a recommendation that 5,000 federal
police be created in Western Germany as an "initial step in
the eventual rearming" of Germany.(14) John J.

McCloy, then

American Commissioner in Germany, also advocated the
formation of a West German federal police force to counter
the Soviet-supported East German build-up of a para-military
police force which had begun in late 1949.(15) By early
1950, then, the Department of Defense was fully committed to
the rearming of Germany, and, from a military point of view,
the sooner the better.
State Department officials, however, were much more
reluctant than their Defense Department counterparts to
embrace a policy of German remilitarization.

Wary of the

political repercussions of arming West Germany, the State
Department repeatedly pledged American commitment to the
policy of disarmament throughout 1949 and the first half of
i

1950.

Of primary importance was minimizing the potential
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for creating strife among the Western Allies over the
question of German participation in Western defense.
France, in particular, was extremely hostile to the notion
of a remilitarized Germany.

Also worrisome were the

possibility of provoking military countermeasures by the
Soviet Union and the increasing likelihood that the two
zones of Germany, if armed one against the other, would
never in future be reunited.

With these possibilities in

mind, Secretary of State Acheson told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in April of 1949 that "the disarmament
and demilitarization of Germany must be complete and
absolute," and that "a discussion of including West Germany
in the [North Atlantic] pact" was impossible.(16) One year
later, in April of 1950, Acheson publicly reiterated the
"firm adherence" of the United States to the continued
disarmament of Germany.(17)
Within the secret confines of the National Security
Council, however, a new mindset conducive to the rearming of
Western Germany began to emerge in early 1950.

NSC-68,

Acheson's blueprint for conducting the Cold War, was drafted
and submitted to the President in April, and in the context
of NSC-68 the rearming of Germany as advocated by the
Defense Department seemed a logical step toward the creation
of sufficient force-in-being to deter Soviet aggression in
Europe.

But through June and July of 1950, Acheson remained

unwilling to offer the State Department's recommendation for
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such a step.

On 5 June, during a statement before Congress

requesting Mutual Defense Assistance funds, Acheson declared
"that the United States would continue the policy of German
demilitarization."(18) And in an addendum to NSC-71, the
State Department refused to "advocate or press for action"
in the question of German rearmament.(19)
Ultimately, it was the North Korean invasion of South
Korea which provided the catalyst necessary to force
Acheson's hand on the matter of Germany.

In Present at the

Creation, Acheson attests that his "conversion to German
participation in European defense was quick.

The idea that

Germany's place in the defense of Europe would be worked out
by a process of evolution was outmoded.

Korea had speeded

up evolution."(20) Several weeks after the invasion, when it
had become apparent that the conflict would protract into a
sustained commitment, Acheson became confident in the
opportunity that Korea provided for implementing the
political programs outlined in NSC-68.

On 31 July 1950,

Acheson proposed to President Truman that a European or
North Atlantic army be created and that German troops be
enlisted within it.(21) The President reluctantly approved
this line of thought and set the State and Defense
Departments to work negotiating a plan for German rearmament
which would be acceptable to the United States' European
allies.
By 5 September, the State and Defense Departments had
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agreed upon a program which subsequently became known as the
"package deal."

This program called for the creation of ten

German divisions to shore up the Western defense.

Bound to

this rearming of Germany, and conditional upon it, were
three other elements designed to gain Allied cooperation,
all of which were to be presented to the North Atlantic
Council as part of a single package:

American

reinforcements in the form of four to six divisions were to
be deployed in Europe as a peace-keeping force?

a Supreme

Allied Commander was to be appointed to coordinate Western
defense and to ensure that the German troops remained in a
subordinate position;
was to be increased.

and American financial aid to Europe
Acheson considered these elements to

provide enough incentive and sufficient reassurance against
possible German aggression to persuade the NATO countries to
agree to German rearmament.

Several days before the

September meetings of the North Atlantic Council in New
York, the package deal was forwarded jointly by the
Departments of State and Defense to President Truman for
official approval.
Truman, like Acheson, had long been wary of considering
the possibility of German rearmament.

The President feared

both the political consequences of such an act and, like the
French, the possibility that a rearmed Germany might once
again become a threat to world peace.

For these reasons, he

favored the continuation of German disarmament as he began
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his second administration and was moved on occasion to
repudiate in "vehement terms” rumors that the United States
was planning to allow West Germany to build up an army.(22)
Nevertheless, the escalation of the Cold War weighed
heavily upon him and he reacted to Soviet moves such as the
Berlin Blockade and the explosion of an atomic device in
decisive fashion by mounting an airlift, approving the North
Atlantic Treaty, and authorizing the development of the
hydrogen bomb.

The idea of German rearmament remained

distasteful to him, however, despite the strategic
recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As late as 16

June 1950, Truman warned in a memorandum to Acheson against
allowing Germany to create a police force which could become
the basis for a future German war machine.(2 3) But the
invasion of South Korea on 25 June apparently convinced
Truman of the necessity of reorganizing the defense of
Western Europe.

On 31 July, Truman accepted Acheson's North

Atlantic Army idea, and on 9 September he gave his approval
to the package deal proposal.
In his memoirs, Truman commented upon the simple logic
behind the inclusion of Germany in Western defense saying
that "without Germany, the defense of Europe was a
rear-guard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.

With

Germany there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough
to offer effective resistance to aggression from the
East."(24) By September of 1950, therefore, Truman had made
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the decision to rearm Germany.

He authorized Acheson to

present the package deal at the North Atlantic Council
meetings in New York a few days later, and the new American
commitment to German rearmament became a matter of public
record.

Though France predictably balked at the idea, every

other NATO country agreed to German rearmament in principle,
and the United States continued to adhere to the policy of
rearmament throughout the remainded of Truman*s
administration, supporting the ill-fated European Defense
Community as well as ultimate German inclusion in NATO.
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CHAPTER II
CONGRESS AND GERMAN REARMAMENT

[A United States Senator] is an
honest man, he is an intense fellow, he gets
all worked up, the blood rushes to his head,
he takes on kind of a wild, stary look at
you, and I just do not think his mind works
in a normal way when he gets excited.(1)
Dean Acheson

Even as the executive branch slowly proceeded during
1949 and the first half of 1950 toward the decision to rearm
Germany, an open-ended debate concerning the future status
of Germany picked up steam in the houses of Congress.
During the 1948 elections,

both the Democrats and the

Republicans had included in their platforms foreign policy
planks condemning Communism, and Congressmen of both parties
generally agreed on the reality of the Soviet threat to
Western Europe.

And in that context, the Berlin crisis had

focused national attention upon the precarious position
Germany as a player in the Cold War in Europe.

of

Though never

officially consulted, Congress had given strong support to
Truman*s handling of the situation, and, by the end of 1949,
Congressmen were aware of the inclinations of American
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military leaders to include German forces as part of the
defense network of Western Europe.

They also understood

that Allied occupation of Germany could not continue
indefinitely.

Thus, they addressed the "German problem"

periodically on the floors of the House and Senate and
within the meeting-rooms of those committees slanted toward
foreign policy.

And, gradually, two opposing camps began to

emerge within Congress, divided over the issue of German
rearmament.

To arm or not to arm, that was the question, as

each side presented its case.
At the heart of the matter for those who voiced
opposition to German rearmament was the fear that the German
people, despite their defeat in 1945 and subsequent Allied
efforts to denazify them, still harbored a dangerous feeling
of ultra-nationalism and a disregard for Western democracy.
If the Germans were permitted to arm themselves again, the
argument went, they would undoubtedly resume the aggressive
ways of the Third Reich and provoke yet another European or
world war.

This perceived possibility of a resurgence of

German fascism provided a persuasive and popular case
against rearming Germany in the houses of Congress during
the first months of Truman's second administration.
In the House of Representatives, concern about German
nationalism and resurgent fascism was expressed periodically
during 1949, prompted in part by rumors that the military
was considering German rearmament and in part by the
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imminent creation of the Federal Republic.
Representative George Sadowski (D, Michigan)

In January,
introduced into

the Congressional Record an article entitled "German Giant
Revived," which emphasized that rebuilding a strong Germany
in order to "take her off the American taxpayer's back"
would result in a "restored Germany again ready for war."(2)
Chet Holifield (D, California) echoed this sentiment in
April when, voicing his alarm over the failure of American
military leaders to "protect the democratic principles in
the rehabilitation of Germany" and lamenting a similar
failure among State Department officials, he quoted from the
pamphlet "Prevent World War III" for the Record:

"[The

Germans] have a long way to go to prove that they are
trustworthy in economics and politics.

So far they have

merely confirmed our fears that they remain unrepentant
supernationalists who are waiting for 'der tag'

[sic]."(3)

In 1950, more members of the House of Representatives
placed their remarks in the Record opposing German
rearmament on the ground that Germany had not yet earned the
trust of the Western democracies by renouncing its
aggressive brand of nationalism.

Among the more outspoken

were such men as Abraham Multer (D, New York), Jacob Javits
(R, New York), William Granahan (D, Pennsylvania), and
Herman Eberharter (D, Pennsylvania).

This whole line of

thought was perhaps best summed up by Representative
Granahan who urged in an address delivered at Mann School in
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Philadelphia on 20 April 1950 that "we must all have a hand
in the great crusade to stem the tide of extreme nationalism
and the remilitarization of an enemy nation that twice in
our lifetime has attempted to enslave the world.

We cannot

afford to give Germans weapons because they will be turned
on u s ." (4)
In the Senate, those who opposed rearmament also
invoked the specter of German nationalism.

Senator Guy M.

Gillette (D, Iowa), worried by reports that denazification
and democratization efforts in Western Germany were being
undermined by a willingness of occupation officials to
cooperate with former Nazis in political, industrial and
educational arenas, declared in a radio interview in June of
1949 that "We simply must know what is going on in Germany,
whether or not the German mind remains the repository for
the Hitler doctrine.

Left to fester and ferment, this

poison will spread, and in 5 years, or 10,

.

we will

be confronted with Nazi fascism again."(5) Senator Estes
Kefauver (D, Tennessee) reiterated this point of view in
October of 1949 and warned that the Germans had not yet
earned the trust of the Western Allies, as did Senator
Robert Hendrickson (R, New Jersey) who decried the coddling
of former Nazis by the occupation hierarchy and publicly
opposed the military's "fantastic plans for restoring German
military might" in a speech to the Jewish War Veterans of
the United States on 17 June 1950. (6)
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In addition to the danger of resurgent fascism in
Germany, some Congressmen opposed German rearmament in 1949
and 1950 because they feared the possibility that a
remilitarized Germany might enter into an opportunistic
alliance with the Soviet Union.

Lumping Stalin's Russia and

Hitler's Germany together in the catch-all category of
totalitarian states and recalling the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact,
men such as Representatives Jacob Javits and Arthur Klein
(D, New York) and Senator Guy Gillette worried that a
rearmed Germany, instead of acting as a bulwark against
Communism, would cast its lot with the Soviets against the
Western democracies.

On 8 August 1949, on the floor of the

House, Javits declared that "Russian manpower and
fanatacism, joined with German technical resources and skill
in military organization could be the solution— sought by
totalitarians of the left and right alike— as to how
American might could be broken."(7) Senator Gillette
concurred, and in February of 1950 singled out what he felt
to be the greatest danger then facing the United States in
the European theater:

"the danger that a rebuilt, rearmed

super-nationalist Germany will unite in totalitarian
brotherhood with the Soviet Union in a third attempt in this
century to conquer the world."(8)
Alarmed, then, by the support of American military
leaders for German rearmament and fearful that the
occupation had not succeeded in eliminating German
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nationalism and adherence to Nazi doctrines, those
congressmen who opposed rearming took such action as they
could to assess the true situation in Germany and to
discourage remilitarization.

On 7 June 1949, Senators Guy

Gillette, Robert Hendrickson, Irving Ives (R, New York), and
Claude Pepper (D, Florida)

introduced a resolution (Senate

Resolution 125) which authorized the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations to conduct an investigation of "all
matters relating to the conduct and status of the
denazification program” in the American occupation zone.(9)
Among those questions considered especially important were
whether or not there was a resurgence of intensive militant
nationalism, whether or not there was a rise of strong
neo-Nazi political parties, and whether or not former Nazis
had been eliminated from influential positions in public
office and industrial organizations.

Rearmament of Germany,

despite the strategic situation in Europe, was unthinkable,
the Senators argued, until these issues had been effectively
addressed.

A similarly-worded resolution (House Resolution

489) was submitted in February of 1950 in the House of
Representatives by Emanuel Celler (D, New York).(10)
In addition to these resolutions, members of
Congressional fact-finding missions in Europe used their
highly public profiles to express opposition to German
rearmament.

On 26 November 1949, five of six members of the

Senatorial Appropriations Subcommittee, having just
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completed a five-week investigation of economic and military
integration in Western Europe, declared in London that they
would "oppose any proposal to rearm the West German state
until the latter was economically stable and democratic 1in
the Western sense of the word.'"(11) A House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee returned a similar verdict in December of 1949
following a mission of inquiry in Europe.

The group

unanimously condemned German rearmament because, member
Jacob Javits reported, the Germans still harbored strong
feelings of "ultranationalism."(12)
On the other side of the coin, however, was a somewhat
smaller group of Congressmen who voiced their support for
German rearmament.

Though wary of German nationalism, this

group subscribed to the Defense Department's view of the
strategic situation in Europe.

Like the Joint Chiefs, these

Congressmen considered a strong Germany necessary to the
European balance of power, both economically and
politically, and regarded the use of German manpower,
military prowess, and territory as necessary for a
defense-in-depth against Communist aggression from the East.
Some supporters of German rearmament qualified their support
by proposing that strict controls be placed upon any German
units raised, while others favored giving Germany a
relatively free hand;

but all agreed on the principle of

German rearament.
In the House, William Lemke (R, North Dakota) was one
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of a very few Representatives to go on record in 1949 as
supporting German rearmament.(13) Though one of a handful of
old progressives still in office, and as such critical of
the Truman administration's extreme anti-Communist stance
and its subsequent (and expensive) emphasis on national
security, Lemke argued that Western Europe could not
function while Germany remained an economic and political
vacuum and he

advocated the creation of a German army

complete with its own general staff.(14) In the Senate,
Walter George (D, Georgia), Elmer Thomas (D, Oklahoma),

and

George Malone (R, Nevada) each declared, in varying degrees,
their support of a rearmed Germany.

Senator George, second

in seniority on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said
in September of 1949 that, in light of the danger to Western
Europe from the Soviet Union, it was "very shortsighted to
continue to tear down the arms factories in Germany."
Germany ought to be permitted to arm itself against
aggression from the East, he argued, and concluded that "the
Germans alone can give military security to Western
Europe."(15) Senator Thomas, a member of the Senatorial
Appropriations Committee, also considered Germany the key to
Western defense and proposed that "several divisions of
German troops should be armed by the United States without
Germany being herself permitted to manufacture arms."(16)
And on 2 6 November 1949, Thomas was the only of six Senators
to speak in favor ot German rearmament following an
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Appropriations Subcommittee investigation of economic and
military integration in Western Europe.(17) Senator Malone,
finally, proposed a remilitarized and industrialized Germany
established as part of a European family of nations, a sort
of United States of Europe, which would reap economic and
defensive benefits while imposing checks upon aggression
from within.(18)
Thus, by early 1950, two camps had developed in
Congress, divided not along party lines but over the
question of whether the United States ought to rearm
Germany.

Of the two viewpoints, to arm or not to arm, the

latter was clearly the more pevasive given the
all-too-recent memories of Nazi Germany and following as it
did the official American policy at that time.

But the

outbreak of armed conflict in Korea in June of 1950 prompted
a reevaluation of the armament question in the houses of
Congress, just as it had in the executive branch of the
government, and in light of this development the tide of
Congressional opinion quickly changed.
In the collective thinking of Congress, the Korean
conflict had, as Acheson put it, speeded up evolution
concerning attitudes toward ultimate position within the
Western European community.

The Cold War had suddenly

become a hot one, in the Asian theater at least, and a
natural hardening of anti-Communist sentiment accompanied
news of the invasion.

The Defense Department's lobby for

37

German rearmament picked up steam and the New York Times
reported on 27 June 1950 that "the campaign [in Washington]
to rearm the West Germans and Japanese [had] increased over
the weekend.” (19) As the Korean conflict protracted into an
extended military involvement incorporating the use of
American troops and prompting military appropriations which
put the United States on a wartime footing once again,
members of Congress began to look at the situation in Europe
from a more purely defensive standpoint, and what they saw
there led most of them during the next two years to cast
their lots with the executive.

Quite simply, following the

North Korean invasion, the military threat from the Soviet
Union eclipsed the potential threat of resurgent Nazism in
Germany, and the question that now faced Congress was no
longer to arm or not to arm but how to arm and to what
extent.
To be sure, there were still those in Congress who felt
that the Germans' penchant for fascism was such that it
precluded German military participation in Western defense,
desirable as that may have been in the face of Soviet
military might.

Jacob Javits, notably, continued throughout

the remainder of Truman's administration to oppose German
rearmament in any capacity.

Soon after the beginning of the

Korean conflict, Javits personally visited President Truman
and appealed to him to prevent the remilitarization of
Germany, and as late as February of 1952 Javits declared
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that "we are in danger of forgetting too soon the brutal
aggression and unparalelled [sic] destruction of the moral
code of civilization in World Wars I and II loosed by
Wilhelm*s Germany and Hitler’s Reich."(20) Several other
members of Congress also periodically sounded the warning
that fascism was not dead in Germany, including
Representative Arthur Klein and Senators Wayne L.

Morse (D,

Oregon) and James Murray (D, Montana), but the number of
nay-sayers dwindled as the "fearful and fearsome year of
1951" progressed.(21)
A handful of other Congressmen, such as Representatives
Toby Morris (D, Oklahoma) and Lawrence H.

Smith (R,

Wisconsin), voiced objections to German rearmament in 1951,
not because of fear of resurgent fascism or because they
objected to rearmament in principle, but because several
polls conducted in Western Germany indicated that a majority
of the German people themselves opposed the militarization
of the Federal Republic.(22) Morris and Smith were afraid it
would be extremely difficult to accomplish a policy of
rearmament given such negative public opinion in Germany.
But the real debate in Congress over German rearmament
after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea concerned not the
principle of rearmament itself, which by September was a
foregone conclusion, but the nature of that rearmament.

On

one side of this new debate stood those Congressmen who
reluctantly accepted the inevitability of a rearmed Western
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Germany, but who also insisted upon instituting controls,
more or less rigid, upon whatever German military forces
might be raised so as to prevent them from acting in an
independent manner.

On the other side stood those

Congressmen who advocated giving Germany a relatively free
hand.
In August of 1950, while addressing the issue of
American commitments to Western European defense on the
floor of the House, Representative William Poage (D, Texas)
proposed as a solution to the manpower problem that
twenty-five divisions of German nationals, including
veterans of the Wehrmacht, be recruited and deployed.

"Let

their company officers be Germans," he suggested, "but make
their field officers Americans.
machines.

Equip them with American

Give them but a few days1 supply of ammunition.

Keep the ammunition reserves in France or even in England,
as assurance that they will never turn on our friends."(23)
This proposal reflected the basic tenor of the support for
German rearmament qualified by specific controls which would
emerge in Congress over the next two years.

The Congressmen

who subscribed to this viewpoint gradually created a general
framework of sorts within which they would accept rearming
Western Germany.

This framework was characterized by

integration of German troops into a European or North
Atlantic army under the leadership of Allied commanders
(essentially the same plan that the North Atlantic Council

40

was then considering), by strict regulations on the kinds of
arms the Germans would be allowed to carry and manufacture
(certainly not the "most modern” weapons), and by a
simultaneous internal suppression of neo-nazism within the
Federal Republic.

These three conditions, it was argued,

would allow the creation of a ground force sufficient to
repel a Communist push into West Germany while providing
adequate insurance against the newly-recruited German
soldiers1 becoming the war machine of a Fourth Reich.
Qualified support of German rearmament proved to be a
popular position in Congress, especially after Acheson
announced in September of 1950 that the United States had
officially committed itself to rearming.

A good number of

Congressmen voiced their approval of a program of
conditional rearmament, among them Senate Majority Leader
Scott Lucas (D, Illinois) and Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Thomas Connally (D, Texas).(24) But
there also emerged a smaller and more radical group of
rearmament advocates who argued that by keeping Germany in a
subordinate military position relative to themselves, the
Western Allies would undermine rather than secure the
integrity of Western defense efforts.

Unless the United

States made peace with Germany and allowed it to enter into
the Western European partnership as a sovereign and equal
state, this group maintained,

"the continuance of Germany in

a second-rate position [would] rankle in the bosoms of
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German leaders of all parties, and the minority which today
cries out that Germany is being frustrated could some day
become a majority."(25) Treating Germany indefinitely as a
conquered nation, in other words, would create an
environment conducive to the rise of another Hitler.

For

this reason Representative Usher Burdick (R, North Dakota)
urged on the floor of the House in September of 1950 that
the United States sign a peace treaty with Western Germany
and permit that country to arm itself.(26) Germany, he
declared, could not remain "virtually a prisoner of war" any
longer.(27) This viewpoint and all that it implied,
including an independent German military force with its own
general staff, was echoed periodically in the House and
Senate during 1951 and 1952.(28)
But whether or not the rearmament of Western Germany
was to be carried out under close Allied supervision or by
the Federal Republic in an independent fashion, a consensus
that rearmament of some sort was both necessary and
inevitable spread through both houses of Congress in the
months after the Korean conflict began.

And that consensus

was reflected in the actions undertaken by Congress in 1951
and 1952.
On 4 April 1951, the Senate passed a resolution (Senate
Resolution 99) proposed by Tom Connally and Richard Russell
(D, Georgia) and amended by Joseph McCarthy (R, Wisconsin)
and Irving Ives (R, New York), which approved the actions of
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President Truman (including the sending of four American
divisions to Europe)

in cooperating in the common defense

efforts of the NATO nations.

The amendment to the

resolution read as follows:
It is the sense of the Senate that
consideration should be given to the
revision of the plans for the defense of
Europe as soon as possible so as to provide
for the utilization on a voluntary basis of
the military and other resources of Western
Germany and Spain, but not exclusive of the
military and other resources of other
nations.(29)
The resolution, as amended, passed the Senate by a vote of
69 to 21 with 6 not voting, and represented a concrete step
toward Senatorial approval of the European Army then being
discussed by Acheson and the North Atlantic Council.(30)
Several months later, Representative William Miller (R,
New York) introduced a resolution requesting the negotiation
of a peace treaty with the Federal Republic and the
admission of Western Germany as a member of the Atlantic
Pact agreement.(31) This proposal was quickly followed by a
joint resolution passed by the House and the Senate to
terminate the state of war between the United States and the
government of Western Germany.(32) President Truman
subsequently approved this resolution and it went into
effect on 3 November 1951 as Public Law 181.
Meanwhile, as 1952 approached, Secretary of State
Acheson was busily negotiating with the foreign ministers of
the Western European powers on the subject of German
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rearmament.

After lengthy discussions, the Western Allies

finally agreed upon a plan for a European Defense Community
to be comprised of France, Western Germany and the Benelux
countries, and which could cooperate militarily with the
North Atlantic Alliance.

Within the context of the EDC,

which provided for specific controls on the nature of German
military participation, Germany would be allowed to raise
500,000 men in twelve divisions.

The EDC Treaty was signed

in Paris on 27 May 1952 and though it did not require the
approval of the United States Senate, both a protocol and a
convention which were adjuncts to it and to the North
Atlantic Treaty and which directly involved the NATO
countries did require Senatorial ratification.
On 1 July 1952, then, the Senate convened to discuss
and vote upon two orders of business concerning the future
status of West Germany.

The first, a Convention on

Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic
of Germany, constituted, in effect, a peace treaty with West
Germany.

The Senate debated the Convention and approved it

by a vote of 77 to 5 with 14 not voting.(33) The second
order of business, a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
on Guaranties Given by the Parties to North Atlantic Treaty
to the Members of the European Defense Community,
effectively admitted the members of the EDC into the North
Atlantic Alliance.

West Germany, significantly, was the

only EDC member that was not already a member of NATO, so
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the Protocol was contrived to bring the Federal Republic
into the Western military alliance.

After some discussion,

the Senate consented to ratification of the Protocol by a
vote of 72 to 5 with 19 not voting.(34) In so doing, the
Senate, with very little internal dissent, voiced its
approval of the Truman administrations's German policy,
specifically that concerning rearmament, by means of direct
action.

Senator Tom Connally, during the discussion of the

Convention, succinctly stated the reasons governing this
Senatorial endorsement and identified the consensus at which
the Senate (and Congress as a whole) had arrived by July of
1952:

"It is obviously in our best interest that Western

Germany be defended, not only because the free world cannot
afford to lose its manpower and industrial capacity but also
because it pushes the boundary of freedom just that much
farther east."(35)
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CHAPTER III
THE PUBLIC AND GERMAN REARMAMENT

A man who is influenced by the polls or
is afraid to make decisions which may make
him unpopular is not a man to represent the
welfare of this country.(1)
Harry S . Truman
We have become of a somewhat
hypochondriac type, and ascertain our state
of health by this mass temperature taking.
Fortunately this was not one of the
hardships of Valley Forge.(2)
Dean Acheson

As the Defense Department clamored for a military
solution to the German problem, as the Secretary of State
wrestled with the political situation in Europe, and as
Congress debated the wisdom of rearming a people which had
only recently been an enemy of the United States, the
American populace continued, as always, to occupy itself
with the more immediate concerns of everyday life.

Yet the

public was not unaware of the issues related to Germany's
future role in the European community or of the precarious
position of Western Germany as a pawn in the Cold War
confrontation between the East and the West.

Indeed,

judging from the results of George Gallup's public opinion
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polls, the American people shared many of the doubts which
troubled government officials during Truman's second
administration.(3)
In the first week of July of 1949, for example, just
over a month before the first elections were held for the
West German parliament, a sample of Americans was asked
whether it believed that the German people were yet capable
of governing themselves in a democratic w a y . (4) Of those
polled, fifty-five percent responded negatively, reflecting
a general concern with the progress of democratization in
occupied Germany.

When asked in September of 1949 whether

they thought that, in the event of another world war, West
Germany would fight against the United States, thirty-two
percent of those polled indicated that they believed the
Federal Republic would turn against the United States.(5)
And in May of 1950, of Americans polled who could correctly
identify the countries then occupying Germany, fifty percent
said that West Germany should not be permitted to rebuild an
army as a protection against Soviet aggression.(6)
These responses demonstrated a public reaction to the
possibility of rearming Germany similar in nature to that
which occurred in Congress in 1949 and the first half of
1950.

In the minds of many Americans, the memory of Nazi

Germany was still too recent, and distrust of the German
people still too great, to allow the creation of a new
German army even as a deterrent to military threats from the
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East.
A reluctance to endorse German rearmament, however, did
not mean that the American populace discounted the Soviet
Union as an adversary and threat to world peace.

Results of

surveys taken in May of 1949, soon after the lifting of the
Berlin Blockade, indicated that the majority of Americans
were extremely suspicious of the motives and intentions of
the Soviet Union.

When asked whether they believed the

Russian government sincerely wanted peace, sixty percent of
those polled responded in the negative.(7) When asked
whether they thought the Soviet Union intended to "cooperate
with [the United States] in world affairs," sixty-two
percent said "no.11(8) When asked whether they believed the
Soviets were trying to become "the ruling power of the
world," or "just building up protection against being
attacked in another war," sixty-six percent responded that
the former was indeed the case.(9) And by December of 1949
the percentage of Americans who believed the Soviet Union
was out to rule the world had increased to seventy
percent.(10)
At roughly the same time, then, that Secretary of State
Acheson began work on the highly secret document NSC-68,
American public opinion had already arrived at the basic
assumptions which Acheson would use to underpin his
blueprint for Cold War foreign policy.

That the majority of

Americans did not believe the Soviet Union wanted peace or
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would cooperate politically with the United States
paralleled Acheson*s belief that the fundamental ideological
differences between the two states would never allow them to
peacefully co-exist.

And the belief that the Soviet Union

was building itself up to be the ruling power of the world
coincided directly with Acheson*s assumption that the
Soviets fully intended to impose their absolute authority
upon the entire Eurasian landmass.
Thus, by 1950, the majority of Americans independently
concurred with the principles underlying what was to become
the Truman administration's working outline for conducting
its foreign policy.

Yet the public, like Acheson and

Truman, remained wary of the Denfense Department's
recommendations for rearming West Germany in response to the
perceived Soviet threat in Europe.

Ultimately, it would

take an "uncontestable" confirmation of the Soviet Union's
intent to exert its control through military means to
convince the American public of the necessity of rearming
the Germans.
That confirmation came in June of 1950 with the
beginning of the Korean conflict.

Like Acheson and Truman,

most Americans assumed that the North Korean invasion was
Soviet-directed.(11) As a result, by November of 1950, the
percentage of the population that believed the Soviet Union
was setting itself up to become the world's ruling power
jumped to eighty-one percent.(12) When questioned about
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China's entry into the fighting, moreover, eighty-one
percent of those polled said that they thought China had
also acted on orders from Russia, and, in February of 1951,
seventy-nine percent of Americans polled indicated that they
believed the Soviet Union wanted the United States to become
entangled in a full-scale war with China "so that Russia
[would] have a better chance of winning in Europe."(13)^
The fighting in Korea, then, served effectively to
corroborate the public's opinion of the Soviet Union's
political and military intentions, to harden anti-Soviet
sentiment, and, as the conflict protracted and threatened to
become a war of major proportions, to focus attention once
again upon the state of Western Europe's defensive
capabilities.

The question of German rearmament

subsequently came to be regarded in a slightly different
light after the North Korean invasion, and, even as it had
in Congress, the newly-realized military threat from the
Soviet Union began to push the memories of Nazi Germany into
the past and to overcome American reluctance to arm a former
enemy.
By August of 1950, seventy-one percent of Americans
polled advocated the creation of a West German armed force
of a size equal to that then being deployed by the
government of the German Democratic Republic.(14) In
December, responding to a question concerning the defense of
Western Europe, fifty—five percent of those polled indicated
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that they thought Western Germany ought to be allowed to
build up an army capable of resisting an attack from the
Soviet Union.(15) A further eight percent answered
similarly, but qualified their approval of such a move by
saying that the proposed German army ought to be under
American or United Nations control.(16) And almost a full
year later, in a survey conducted in September of 1951,
fully seventy-two percent of the respondents favored the use
of West German troops in an Allied European defense force
under the command of General Eisenhower.(17)
Thus, American public support for a rearmed Germany
quickly mounted following the outbreak of hostilities in
Korea.

Inasmuch as most Americans shared the Truman

administrations perception of the Soviet Union, and because
the Korean conflict appears to have provided a catalyst for
re-examining the military situation in Western Europe both
on official and public levels, it is reasonable to assume
that a growing fear of the Soviet Union in the public mind
eclipsed the old fear of resurgent Nazism, creating a
climate favorable to the idea of German rearmament.
To be sure, an undercurrent of public opposition to
German rearmament persisted even after Korea.

In early

1951, for instance, a number of organizations went on record
as opposing German rearmament in any form, including the
National Executive Committee of Jewish War Veterans and the
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.(18)
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But no sustained public protest against the government's
commitment to rearming Germany ever materialized, and the
issue never became a source of significant public debate,
even when Acheson dropped the "bomb at the Waldorf" in
September of 1950.(19) The American public, therefore, lent
its tacit support to the principle of German rearmament and
allowed the Truman administration (as well as subsequent
administrations) a free hand in pursuing that policy after
the fall of 1950.
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CHAPTER IV
A BRIEF CONCLUSION

Ideally, American foreign policy ought to reflect a
general consensus among the executive branch of government,
Congress, and

the American public as to which actions and

programs best

serve the interests of the United States.

In

practice, however, because the initiative and ultimate
responsibility for foreign policy reside with the executive
branch, foreign-policy decisions, particularly those dealing
with national

security, are often made by the President

without first

consulting Congress or the whims of public

opinion.

In such cases, the repercussions of an unpopular

foreign-policy program are left to work themselves out after
the fact.
The Truman administration^ decision to arm Western
Germany was just such a case.

By approving the package deal

in September of 1950, Truman committed the United States to
a policy of German rearmament only five years after the
defeat of the Third Reich.

In so doing, the President

yielded to the wishes of the Department of Defense, which
for some time had argued that arming Western Germany was a

59

crucial element in defending Western Europe against the
Soviet Union, and of Dean Acheson's State Department which
advocated German arming as a concrete step toward
realization of the larger political plan put forward in
NSC-68.

Truman himself, though reluctant to give the

Germans arms, finally agreed to do so soon after the
outbreak of the Korean conflict, having become convinced of
the Soviet Union's predilection for using force (albeit
through a North Korean proxy) in pursuing its political
goals and of the efficacy of a tough stance (as during the
Berlin crisis) in opposing Soviet thrusts.

In the minds of

the members of the Truman administration, then, the looming
threat of communist expansion had eclipsed by 1950 the
lingering fears of a fascist resurgence in Western Germany,
and the arming of the Federal Republic had become a logical
step in the shoring up of Western Europe.
The announcement of this new policy, which amounted to
a complete reversal of the administration's previous staunch
commitment to a demilitarized Germany, might well have been
expected to provoke a strong measure of Congressional
disapproval, as well as substantial public outcry.

Indeed,

a sizable Congressional faction opposing German rearmament
had repeatedly prompted the Truman administration in 1949
and the first half of 1950 to deny rumors that the United
States intended to arm Western Germany, and American public
opinion had likewise reflected fairly widespread suspicion
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of the new German Republic and of the wisdom of arming it.
Yet in the months following Acheson*s dropping of the *'bomb
at the Waldorf" in September of 1950, organized
Congressional opposition to the new policy failed to emerge,
despite even the vigorous efforts of liberals like Jacob
Javits.

Instead, Congress gradually moved toward a position

of acquiescence with regard to German rearmament and soon
lent its direct support to the policy through such measures
as the passing of Senate Resolution 99 and Public Law 181
and the ratification of the Convention on Relations and the
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Nor did any

substantial public protest against the new U.S.
to a rearmed Germany ever develop.

commitment

Quite to the contrary,

surveys conducted in late 1950 and in 1951 indicated that a
clear majority of Americans were now in favor of
incorporating German troops into the Western defense
network.
Why, then, did no real domestic opposition to German
rearmament materialize after September of 1950?

To a large

extent, the timing of the policy decision contributed
materially to its eventual acceptance, coming as it did
within a rapidly progressing geo-political realignment and
coinciding with an immediate military crisis which together
rendered German rearmament acceptable to a Congress and an
American public otherwise indisposed to the idea of a
remilitarized Germany so soon after the conclusion of the
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Second World War.

Just as the polarization of world power

and the crystallization of the Cold War had become the
primary issues facing American foreign-policy-makers in
1950, the East-West conflict had become a fact of life and a
matter of great concern and anxiety for the American
populace as a whole.

And the North Korean invasion of South

Korea, precipitating a direct military response from the
United States complete with substantial troop commitments,
brought the ideological confrontation between the Soviet
Union and the United States to a head.

It was in this

political and military context that Congress and the
American public would find it both premissable and necessary
to arm the Federal Republic of Germany.
Prior to the outbreak of armed conflict in Korea, the
possibility that a rearmed and economically revitalized
German state might once again become a threat to world peace
had been sufficient to convince many Congressmen to oppose
the viewpoint (held by the Defense Department and by a
handful of Senators and Representatives) that a strong
Germany was an essential component in defending Western
Europe against the Soviet Union.

Despite increasingly

alarming Cold War developments, including the Berlin
blockade and the Soviets' breaking of the American atomic
monopoly, Congress apparently continued to fear the defeated
Germans at least as much as it did the newly-powerful Soviet
Union.

The North Korean invasion of South Korea, however,
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rather forcefully propelled Congress into the postwar era
and convinced most Congressmen that global Communist
expansion posed a greater threat to the security of the
United States than did the dwindling potential of resurgent
fascism in Western Germany.

As the Soviets replaced the

Germans as the American enemy of choice, Congress was quick
to re-evaluate its stance on the priorities involved in
Western European defense, aligning itself thereafter with
the policy decisions of the Truman administration.
In the arena of public opinion, too, the Korean
conflict seems to have provided the catalyst necessary for a
public conversion to support of German rearmament.

In 1949

and 1950, before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the
American populace harbored a lingering distrust of the
German people and appeared reluctant to rearm a nation so
recently defeated as an enemy.

At the same time, however,

the public was becoming increasingly wary of the Soviet
Union and of what it perceived (like Acheson and the NSC) as
a Soviet intention to dominate the Eurasian landmass.

The

Korean conflict, subsequently, served to confirm the
public's worst fears about the Soviet Union.

Soon after its

beginning, a majority of Americans began to support the idea
of arming Western Germany as a means to prevent possible
Soviet military advances into Western Europe.

The fear of a

real Soviet military threat had eclipsed in the minds of
Americans the fear of a potential fascist resurgence in
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Western Germany.
The crystallization of the Cold War, then, involving
the American adoption of a relatively extreme anti-Soviet
mentality, combined with the sensational nature of the
Korean conflict to create an atmosphere favorable to the
acceptance of German rearmament by the American public and
Congress.

The announcement of the new policy in September

of 1950 met with no substantial opposition because Congress
and the public, swayed by the same factors which earlier
convinced Truman of the necessity of an armed Germany, had
already arrived at the same conclusion:

in the face of the

perceived Soviet military threat to Western Europe, the
arming of the Federal Republic of Germany was required for
Western security.

Thus, the pursual of the Cold War as

policy by the Truman administration and the experience of
the Cold War as reality by Congress and the public led
inexorably to an American commitment to German rearmament
and to Congressional and public acquiescence to that
commitment.
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